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Recent Developments 
Mendelson v. Mendelson: 
ENFORCEMENT OF SPOUSAL 
SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
INCORPORATED BUT NOT 
MERGED INTO DIVORCE 
DECREE liMITED TO TERMS OF 
CONTRACT 
In Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 
486, 541 A.2d 1331 (1988), the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland considered 
the power of a court to modify a separa-
tion agreement after the enrollment of a 
divorce decree. The court held that the 
parties were limited to an action at con-
tract since the separation agreement con-
tained a non-merger clause. Thus, the 
parties' rights to seek modification or ter-
mination of contractual spousal support 
were limited to the conditions of the agree-
ment. 
Erwin Mendelson (appellant), and 
Helene Mendelson (appellee) entered into 
a separation and property settlement agree-
ment in July 1976. The parties agreed to 
the payment of spousal support, a cost of 
living adjustment and the termination of 
support upon death or appellee's remar-
riage. Further, appellee waived the right to 
seek additional alimony provided that 
appellant upheld the terms of the agree-
ment. 
The final section of the agreement pro-
vided the terms under which appellant 
could seek a reduction in spousal support. 
The parties agreed that if appellant either 
became disabled, or retired at age 60 or 
thereafter, "the parties shall attempt to 
agree on alimony ... payments that are 
equitable in light of changed financial 
resources." The Mendelson's stipulated 
that either could seek relief of court if they 
were unable to reach an agreement upon 
the occurrence of the above conditions. Id. 
at 491-92,541 A.2d at 1334. The separation 
agreement was incorporated but not 
merged into the decree of divorce of the 
Circuit Court of Montgomery County in 
March 1977. 
Several years after the divorce, appellee 
developed a close personal relationship 
with Manuel Epstein, who later moved 
into appellee's home. Epstein shared 
responsibility for the payment of various 
household expenses. Id. 
In November 1985 appellant petitioned 
the court to terminate or reduce spousal 
support based on his former wife's 
changed financial circumstances and 
"flagrant misconduct" with respect to the 
terms and conditions of the separation 
agreement. The domestic relations master 
determined that appellee's relationship did 
not significantly alter her financial condi-
tion and did not constitute "flagrant mis-
conduct." The circuit court overruled 
appellant's exceptions and affirmed the 
master's report. Appellant then sought 
leave of the decision of the lower court 
through an appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. Id. 
Judge Bloom, delivering the opinion of 
the court, avoided ruling on the merits of 
the arguments upon which the appeal was 
based. Id. at 493, 541 A.2d 1335. See Atkin· 
son 'V. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 281 A.2d 
407 (1971); Roberts v. Roberts, 35 Md. App. 
497, 371 A.2d 689 (1977); Meyer 'V. ltfeyer, 
41 Md. App. 13,394 A.2d 1220 (1978); cert. 
denied. 284 Md. 746 (1979). Instead, the 
court concluded: 
We need not resolve this dispute. We 
do not reach it because there is a more 
fundamental basis for affirming the 
denial of appellant's petition to ter-
minate or modify support. By provid-
ing that their agreement should be 
incorporated but not merged in the 
divorce decree, the parties deprived the 
court of any post-enrollment power to 
end or diminish the contractual sup-
port for any reason not specified in the 
agreement. 
Mendelson at 495, 541 A.2d at 1335. 
The court began its discussion of the 
applicable law with a review of the distinc-
tions among alimony, technical alimony 
and contractual spousal support. The trad-
tional definition of alimony was "court 
ordered payments to a wife for her sup-
port to continue during the joint lives of 
both husband and wife and so long as the 
parties live separate and apart." Id. {citing 
Bebermeyer '0. Bebermeyer, 241 Md. 72, 215 
A.2d 463 (1965». This definition was later 
modified to eliminate gender bias and 
allow awards of alimony for a limited or 
indefinite duration. Mendelson at 496, 541 
A.2d at 1336 (citing Md. Fam. Law Code 
Ann. §§11-106(a), 11-106(c) (1984, 1987 
Cum. Supp.». If the agreed spousal sup-
port could have been awarded absent the 
agreement, the agreement was considered 
technical alimony once it was made part of 
the decree. Bebermeyer at 77, 215 A.2d at 
468. Whereas the court was empowered to 
award alimony, spousal support could be 
granted only upon agreement of the par-
ties. Mendelson at 496, 541 A.2d at 1336 
{citing Bello/atto 'V. Bello/atto, 245 Md. 379, 
226 A.2d 313 (1967». Support provisions 
which failed to meet the definition of tech-
nical alimony remained contractual even 
though they were made part of the decree. 
lIfendelson at 496, 541 A.2d at 1336. 
Erosion of these distinctions became 
clear after 1950. Prior to 1950 a spousal 
support agreement which did not qualify 
as technical alimony could be enforced by 
sequestration, execution and attachment. 
Contractual spousal support could not, 
however, be enforced by imprisonment 
for contempt. Further, contractual spousal 
support could not be modified by the 
court. Id. at 497, 541 A.2d 1336 (citing 
Soldano '0. Soldano. 258 Md. 145,265 A.2d 
263 (1970); Reichhart 'V. Brent, 247 Md. 66, 
230 A.2d 326 (1967); Dickey '0. Dickey, 154 
Md. 675, 141 A. 387 (1928». 
These established principles of domestic 
law were changed significantly by amend-
ments to the Maryland Constitution and 
the Maryland Family Law Article. Md. 
Fam. Law Code Ann. § 8-103(b) (1984, 
1987 Cum. Supp.». In 1950, the Maryland 
Constitution was amended to allow 
imprisonment for a violation of a divorce 
decree: 
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No person shall be imprisoned for 
debt, but a valid decree of a court of 
competent jurisdiction or agreement 
approved by decree of said court for the 
support of a spouse .. . shall not consti· 
tute a debt within the meaning of this 
section. 
Md. Const. art III, § 38 (emphasis added). 
The aforementioned section of the code 
also states that contractual spousal support 
is subject to modification unless the parties 
provide otherwise. Mendelson at 497, 541 
A.2d at 1336. 
With recognition of the plain language 
of the statutes, the court determined that 
[d]espite the amended language of arti-
cle III, § 8-103(b) of the Family Law 
Code, unless the separation agreement 
is made part of the divorce decree, it 
cannot be enforced by imprisonment 
for contempt. There being no order to 
pay the support, failure to ptry would 
merely be a breach of contract and not 
contemptuous disobedience of a court 
order. 
Mendelson at 497-98, 541 A.2d at 1337 (em-
phasis added). The court concluded that 
the separation agreement was separate 
from the decree of divorce despite the clear 
language of th.e statute. There was there-
fore no basis from which to modify the 
agreement. Id. 
The Mendelson court then examined the 
case law regarding non-merger clauses and 
the attendant beliefs held by members of 
the legal community resulting therefrom. 
The court recognized that prior to 1983 it 
was commonplace for attorneys to insert 
non-merger clauses in separation agree-
ments. Judge Bloom then cited two cases 
which discussed the effect of non-merger 
clauses, Id. at 1337 (citing Johnston v. 
Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 465 A.2d 436 (1983); 
Hamilos v. Hamilos, 297 Md. 99, 465 A.2d 
445 (1983», and reasoned that: 
[i]t was apparently believed that incor-
poration would make the agreement 
part of the decree while non-merger 
would preserve its contractual status. 
Thus, in the event of a breach, it was 
thought, the aggrieved party would 
have the choice of enforcing the decree 
or suing on the contract. Since such 
language is still being inserted in sep~ 
ration agreements, we suspect that 
Johnston has been ignored or misread. 
Id. at 495,541 A.2d 1336 (emphasis added). 
Mendelson relied primarily on the ration-
ale of Johnston, which concerned the ques-
tion of whether a separation agreement 
incorporated but not merged into a 
divorce decree was subject to collateral 
attack. Johnston explained the difference 
between the terms "incorporation" and 
"merger." Whereas "incorporation" is the 
mere identification and approval of the 
validity of a separation agreement, 
"merger" is a substitution of rights and 
duties.Id. at 498, 541 A.2d 1337. The sepa-
ration agreement is said to be superseded 
by the decree when the agreement is 
merged into the decree, and when the 
agreement fails to indicate whether it 
should be merged. As such, the agreement 
would be enforceable through contempt 
proceedings. Alternatively, if the separ~ 
tion agreement contains a non-merger 
clause, the agreement is not superseded by 
the decree and retains its "life" as a con-
tract. But, because the agreement is a con-
tract, it is not enforceable through 
contempt proceedings. In applying 
Johnston to the facts in Mendelson, the 
court held that since the separation and 
property settlement agreement was not 
made part of the decree, the agreement 
remained separate from the decree and 
thus could not be enforced through con-
tempt proceedings. Id. at 499, 541 A.2d 
1338. 
The court then turned its attention to 
the question of whether the separation 
agreement sub judice could be modified or 
terminated by the court. By the terms of 
the agreement, modification of spousal 
support could take place only upon appel-
lant's disability or retirement at age 60 or 
thereafter. Since the separation agreement 
was not merged, the agreement and not the 
decree dictated the conditions under 
which modification could be compelled. 
Due to the rule foreclosing collateral 
attack on agreements approved by a court 
of competent jurisdiction, "[t]he circuit 
court that issued that decree lost its contin-
uing jurisdiction over it and thus any 
power to modify it when the decree 
became enrolled." Id. at 500, 541 A.2d 
1338. 
The court held that the separation agree-
ment was unambiguous regarding the 
terms under which spousal support could 
be terminated. The conditions precedent 
to the termination of spousal support were 
remarriage of appellee, or the death of 
either party. Since neither event occured, 
the court held that the termination provi-
sions had not been activated. Id. 
The holding in Mendelson v. Mendelson 
will affect many areas of domestic practice 
in Maryland. Those who entered into sep~ 
ration agreements with non-merger clauses 
might refuse to pay spousal and perhaps 
even child support-the only recourse 
being an action for breach of contract. 
Cases concerning these and similar issues 
will undoubtedly lead to a review of 
Mendelson by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. In subsequent actions. 
Mendelson may be attacked as inconsistent 
with the intent of Johnston, Hamilos, the 
Family Law Article and the Maryland 
Constitution. Additionally, since the issue 
of non-merger clauses was clearly not the 
subject of appellant's action, the court's 
analysis regarding non-merger clauses may 
be considered dicta and given less weight. 
Finally, there lies the question of the 
potential liability of attorneys who 
inserted non-merger clauses in separation 
agreements, erroneously assuring clients 
that, in the event of breach, an action 
either for breach or contempt of court 
could be maintained. 
- Jules R. Brickel 
Coy v. Iowa: PLACING SCREEN 
BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND 
WITNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIAL 
VIOIA TES 1HE RIGHT TO FACE-
TO-FACE CONFRONTATION 
In Coy v. Iowa, __ U.S. ~ 108 S. 
Ct. 2798 (1988), the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in a plurality opinion, held 
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution gives a defendant the right to literal 
face-to-face confrontation with the 
witnesses against him. The plurality ar-
rived at its decision by emphasizing that a 
fair trial requires face-to-face confronta-
tion between the accused and the accuser 
in a criminal prosecution. 
In August of 1985, the appellant, John 
Avery Coy, was charged with sexually 
assaulting two minor girls while they were 
camping out in the backyard of the house 
next door to his. The girls claimed that 
Coy came into their tent, with a stocking 
over his head, while they were sleeping. 
Coy shined a flashlight in their eyes and 
told them not to look at him. Consequent-
ly, the girls could not identify his face. 
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